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ARTICLE 
REASON, PASSION AND SELF-CONTROL  : 
UNDERSTANDING THE MORAL BASIS 
OF THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE
par George MOUSOURAKIS* 
Cet article présente la nature de la provocation ainsi que la façon 
d’interpréter celle-ci en tant que moyen de défense en droit criminel et, plus 
particulièrement, pour les accusations de meurtre. Il vise à expliquer comment 
la provocation peut être conceptualisée afin de comprendre l’excuse partielle 
accordée lorsque cette défense est acceptée comme une concession de la 
fragilité humaine. L’auteur soutient que la défense de provocation agit comme 
une excuse fondée sur l’hypothèse qu’un acte de provocation est capable de 
faire accroître la pression psychologique à un degré tel que celle-ci se 
transforme en colère passionnelle, assez importante pour priver la personne de 
sa capacité à agir moralement. La provocation ne peut toutefois pas entraîner 
une excuse complète. Même s’il était impossible de faire diminuer la colère de 
la personne, celle-ci devrait être en mesure de reconnaître l’excès et de 
comprendre qu’il y a de bonnes raisons de ne pas agir par le simple désir de 
tuer quelqu’un. Bien que la défense de provocation nie l’existence de la mens 
rea, élément essentiel du crime, elle ne peut toutefois pas empêcher la 
condamnation pour une infraction moindre d’homicide involontaire. 
This paper discusses the nature of provocation and the proper way to 
interpret provocation as a defence, particularly in relation to murder charges. Its 
aim is to explain how provocation can be conceptualized as a partial excuse by 
examining the traditional understanding of the provocation defence as a 
concession to human frailty. It is argued that the defence operates as an excuse 
on the assumption that an act of provocation is capable of raising in a person 
such a degree of psychological pressure, in the form of angry passion, as to 
deprive her of her ability to act morally voluntarily, i.e. the ability to act 
according to an all-things-considered moral choice. The paper aims to explain, 
moreover, why provocation cannot provide a complete excuse. It is argued that, 
while the provoked agent may not be able to suppress her anger, she is 
deemed capable of recognizing that there are overriding reasons for not acting 
on the desire to kill which may arise in her emotional state. Although a 
successful plea of provocation negates the degree of moral culpability required 
for murder, it cannot prevent conviction for the lesser offence of manslaughter 
for a provoked killing still manifests a socially undesirable disposition or trait 
of character.  
*
. Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Auckland, New Zealand; Professor of 
Comparative Law, Niigata University, Japan. 
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Introduction 
    
 In England and other common law jurisdictions provocation 
operates as a mitigatory or partial defense to murder aimed at the 
reduction of that offence to voluntary (or intentional) manslaughter1.  
For a plea of provocation to succeed the jury must be satisfied that 
the accused was deprived of her self-control at the time of the killing 
(the subjective test) and that this was the result of wrongful conduct 
serious enough to provoke an ordinary or reasonable person (the 
objective test). If there is no evidence to support a finding of 
provocation, the defence will fail, whether the accused lost her self-
control or not. Moreover, even if the victim's conduct was such as to 
amount to provocation in law, the defence cannot be relied upon if 
evidence shows that the accused did not lose self-control as a result. 
Determining the threshold of legal provocation presupposes a moral 
judgment about what sort of offensive conduct is capable of arousing 
in a person such a degree of justified anger or indignation that might 
                                                 
1 . The English Homicide Act, 1957 (c.11) section 3. (“Where on a charge of 
murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that the person charged 
was provoked (whether by things done or by things said or by both together) 
to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was enough to 
make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined by the 
jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account 
everything both done and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, 
it would have on a reasonable man”); Law Commission Consultation Paper No 
177, A New Homicide Act for England and Wales?, 2005 at 171-176. (The Law 
Commission recently published a detailed Consultation Paper reviewing the 
present law and proposing a series of possible options for reform); Law 
Commission Report No 290, Partial Defenses to Murder, 2004, s. 232. (“(1) 
Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be reduced to 
manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat of passion 
caused by sudden provocation. (2) A wrongful act or an insult that is of such 
nature as to be sufficient to deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-
control is provocation for the purposes of this section if the accused acted on 
it on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool. (3) For the 
purposes of this section, the questions (a) whether a particular wrongful act 
or insult amounted to provocation, and (b) whether the accused was deprived 
of the power of self-control by the provocation that he alleges he received, are 
questions of fact, but no one shall be deemed to have given provocation to 
another by doing anything that he had a legal right to do, or by doing 
anything that the accused incited him to do in order to provide the accused 
with an excuse for causing death or bodily harm to any human being.”); The 
New Zealand Crimes Act, 1961, s. 169. (Treatment of provocation in other 
common law jurisdictions); The New South Wales Crimes Act, 1900, s. 23; 
Queensland Criminal Code, 1899, s. 304; Criminal Code of Western Australia, 
1913, ss. 281and 245. 
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defeat her capacity for self-control. Although legal wrongdoings of a 
significant nature should for the most part provide a sufficient basis 
for the defense, non-legal, moral wrongdoings may also be considered 
serious enough to pass the threshold of provocation in law. Over this 
threshold, provocations may vary from the less serious ones (e.g. 
verbal provocations) to those involving very serious wrongdoings (e.g. 
provocations involving physical violence). Provocations involving 
different forms and degrees of wrongdoing may equally support a 
partial defence to murder, provided that the requirement of loss of 
self-control is also satisfied.  
 
 The provocation defence is understood to hinge upon two 
interrelated elements : the wrongful act of provocation and impaired 
volition or loss of self-control. The first element is taken to be 
justificatory in character, for it focuses upon a condition that, on the 
face of it, is capable of affecting the wrongfulness of the actor's 
conduct quite independently of her state of mind. The second 
element, by placing the emphasis on the actor's state of mind and her 
inability to exercise control over her actions, is clearly excusative in 
nature. Because provocation rests upon both excusative and 
justificatory considerations, the rationale of the legal defence has 
been difficult to locate2. As Alldridge has remarked : 
 
The defence [of provocation] must be either a partial excuse 
(in which case the centre of the inquiry will be whether or not 
the defendant lost his/her self-control) or a partial 
justification (in which case the centre of the inquiry will be 
what was actually done by the deceased to the defendant — to 
what extent the deceased 'asked for it')...It is interesting to 
note that both these conditions obtained at common law.3 
                                                 
2 . J. L. Austin, "A Plea for Excuses" (1968) 19 The Philosophy of Action at 20. 
("It is arguable that we do not use the terms justification and excuse as we 
might; a miscellany of even less clear terms, such as 'extenuation', 
'palliation', 'mitigation', hovers uneasily between partial justification and 
partial excuse; and when we plead, say, provocation, there is genuine 
uncertainty or ambiguity as to what we mean? is he partly responsible, 
because he roused a violent passion in me, so that it wasn't truly me acting? 
of my own accord' (excuse)? Or is it rather that, he having done me such 
injury, I was entitled to retaliate (justification)?"). 
3 . Peter Alldridge, "The Coherence of Defences" (1983) Criminal Law Review 665 
at 669. ("careful analysis of the language and of the results of common law 
heat of passion cases demonstrates that there is an uncertainty whether the 
defence is a sub-species of justification or of excuse"); Joshua Dressler, 
"Rethinking Heat of Passion : A Defence in Search of a Rationale" (1982) 73 
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 Although the justificatory element may have played a part in 
the shaping of the legal doctrine of provocation, its role in modern law 
is diminished. The idea that an act of revenge may be partially 
justified conflicts with fundamental presuppositions of the criminal 
law as a system whose very point is shifting the authority and moral 
basis of actions from the domain of subjective attitudes to general 
and impersonal norms of conduct4. Although for the defence of 
provocation to succeed it must be established that the accused was 
sufficiently wronged by her victim, the rationale of the defence in law 
is more satisfactorily explained in terms of the excuse theory. The real 
basis of the provocation defense, traditionally regarded as a 
concession to human frailty, lies in the actor's loss of self-control in 
circumstances in which any ordinary person might also have lost 
control5. In this respect, the wrongful act of provocation is seen as 
providing a morally acceptable explanation for the accused's loss of 
self-control and killing rather than a reason for directly reducing the 
wrongfulness of her actions.  
 
Conceptualizing Provocation as a Partial Excuse 
 
 The description of provocation as a concession to human frailty 
reflects the conception of the defence as an excuse6. This approach to 
the defence hinges on the notion of impaired volition or loss of self-
                                                 
Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 421 at 428; Joshua Dressler, 
"Provocation : Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?" (1988) 51 Modern Law 
Review at 467. 
4 . A. von Hirsch and N. Jareborg, "Provocation and Culpability", in F. Schoeman 
(ed), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions, (Cambridge : Cambridge 
University Press, 1987) at 242. ("Although the [provoker] might deserve 
punishment, the actor lacks authority to inflict it. Penalizing malefactors is 
not a legitimate role for an individual; it is a state function, to be undertaken 
with appropriate due process safeguards."). 
5 . Duffy [1949] 1 All ER 932. ("Circumstances which include a desire for 
revenge are inconsistent with provocation, since the conscious formulation of 
a desire for revenge means that a person has had time to think, to reflect, 
and that would negative a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, which is 
of the essence of provocation"). 
6 . Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588. ("The law has to reconcile respect for the 
sanctity of human life with recognition of the effect of provocation on human 
frailty"); O'Regan, "Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation" (1968) 
319 Criminal Law Review at 320. ("The doctrine of provocation is a 
concession to human frailty, a recognition that a lower standard of criminal 
responsibility should apply to one who kills when he is 'for the moment not 
master of his mind'."). See also R. Perkins, Criminal Law (Brooklyn : 
Foundation Press, 1957) at 42. 
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control. Its governing assumption is that provocative conduct, when it 
is sufficiently serious, is capable of inflaming anger to such a degree 
as to be likely to lead the provoked person to lose her self-control and 
retaliate in violence. When the provoked person loses self-control she 
is unable to weigh up the consequences of her action according to 
reason. It is not that the provoked person lacks the capacity to 
reason. Her judgment that there has been a wrongdoing is a reasoned 
judgment, but the reasoning then breaks down so that her actions 
that stem from that judgment are no longer the product of reason. As 
Horder explains : 
 
Action stemming from a loss of self-control...are the product of 
a judgment (of a certain degree of wrongdoing) and a desire 
following in the wake of the judgment that controls the will 
without, for the moment, the restraining or guiding influence 
of reason.7 
  
 Although losing self-control and killing as a response to 
provocation is not totally excusable, the actor's degree of moral 
culpability falls short of that required to convict her of murder. From 
the point of view of the excuse theory, the gravity of the provocation is 
relevant to assessing the accused's claim that she was provoked to 
lose her self-control. There is no question here of whether the 
wrongful and culpable character of the provocative conduct should 
render the killing objectively less wrongful or partially justified. It is, 
rather, the accused's loss of self-control, as a result of provocation, 
that accounts for and justifies the reduction of culpability and, 
consequently, the reduction of the offence from murder to 
manslaughter. To gain some insight into the excusative element in 
provocation, it is necessary to consider what human frailty means 
and how it relates to the loss of control requirement that, from the 
viewpoint of the excuse theory, constitutes the true basis of the 
provocation defence. 
 
Loss of Self-Control as a Basis for Excusing 
  
 In provocation it is not required that the actor loses her self-
control to the extent that she does not know what she is doing, or 
what her action is aimed at; but self-control must be lost to such an 
                                                 
7 . Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 
1992) at 164. 
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extent that for the moment her action is being guided by passion 
rather than by reason. Indeed, it is an important prerequisite for 
pleading provocation as a partial defence to murder that the accused 
have acted with the requisite mens rea for murder (in England, an 
intention to kill or to cause grievous bodily harm). If the provoked 
agent loses her self-control to such an extent as to be unaware of the 
nature or quality of her act, or unable to exercise control over her 
bodily movements, then she may be entitled to full acquittal on the 
basis of a lack of actus reus or mens rea defence. Other things being 
equal, if the provoked agent suffers a total loss of self-control, 
automatism may provide the appropriate basis for a complete defence 
to the charge of murder8. Nevertheless, in those cases of provocation 
where the actor is totally deprived of her ability to control her 
conduct, the victim's provocation might perhaps be regarded as a 
triggering factor of the excusing condition — i.e. automatism — 
providing the basis of his defence to murder. Thus, although another 
excuse takes the priority over provocation here, the latter might be 
granted a role peripheral to or supportive of the defence relied upon9. 
  
    In the context of excuse theory, the role of loss of control is 
understood in the light of the important distinction between 
involuntariness and moral or normative involuntariness. The term 
involuntariness is used to denote one's total inability to direct one's 
conduct or to exercise control over one's bodily movements. It might 
be said that, in such cases, the agent acts only in appearance 
because the conduct is no longer subject to conscious determination 
by the agent10. Normative or moral involuntariness, on the other 
                                                 
8 . T. Archibald, "The Interrelationship Between Provocation and Mens Rea : A 
Defence of Loss of Self-Control" (1985-86) 28 Crim. L.Q. 454 at 454. ("It may 
be possible to argue in extremely exceptional cases where there is some 
evidence pointing towards the inference that the accused suffered a total loss 
of control, that his conduct was involuntary and unconscious; therefore, the 
actus reus of the crime might be negatived and the accused could be 
acquitted on the basis that the automatic conduct gives rise to the defense of 
automatism."). 
9 . E. Colvin, Principles of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (Toronto : Carswell Pub., 1991) at 
253. ("Extreme rage may produce a state of dissociation under which conduct 
is no longer being directed by a reasoning mind and there is therefore no 
voluntary actus reus. Similarly, provocation may induce a state of impaired 
cognition which negatives mens rea."). 
10 . J. Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2d ed. (New York : Bobbs-Merrill, 
1960) at 422.  (With regard to conduct whose cause is "entirely outside the 
person, where his 'self' does not participate in the slightest degree, the legal 
rules represent the traditional judgment that the defendant has not acted at 
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hand, pertains to those cases where the agent, although she is able to 
direct her external conduct (to ‘act’, in a strict sense), is unable to act 
as she chooses — or would have chosen — due to external or internal 
constraints on her freedom to choose (cases of ‘overpowered will’). 
According to Fletcher : 
 
Excuses arise in cases in which the actor's freedom of choice 
is constricted. His conduct is not strictly involuntary as if he 
suffered a seizure or if someone pushed his knife-holding 
hand down on the victim's throat. In these cases there is no 
act at all, no wrongdoing and therefore no need for an excuse. 
The notion of involuntariness at play is what we should call 
moral or normative involuntariness. Were it not for the 
external pressure, the actor would not have performed the 
deed. In Aristotle's words, he 'would not choose any such act 
in itself'.11 
 
 An action may be contrary to choice not only when it does not 
reflect a choice the actor has already made, but also when it goes 
against a choice the actor would have made, had she the time or 
opportunity to deliberate according to the principles which she would 
normally employ in making moral decisions. For example, a person 
who would normally not use violence against another, on a particular 
occasion does so carried away by anger. For such a person resorting 
to violence is against her moral principles and she would not have 
acted so by choice had she kept her temper in check and taken time 
to deliberate about her response.  
 
  The distinction between involuntariness and moral or 
normative involuntariness is allied to that between compulsion and 
coercion. A person acting under compulsion is unable to exercise 
physical control over her bodily movements, in other words, is not 
free to act. A coerced person, by contrast, although she is free to act 
in a strict sense, is not free to choose the direction of her action12. 
                                                 
all, i.e. 'act' implies volition.");  S. C. Coval and J. S. Smith, Law and its 
Presuppositions : Actions, Agents and Rules (London : Routledge, 1986). 
11 . G. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (Boston and Toronto : Little, Brown & 
Co, 1978) at 803. 
12 . D. Hoekema, Rights and Wrongs (Toronto : Assoc. Univ. Presses, 1986) at 75; 
Edwards, "Compulsion, Coercion, and Criminal Responsibility" (1951) 14 
Modern Law Review at 297. (For an analysis of the distinction between 
compulsion and coercion) ; H. G. Frankfurt, "Coercion and Moral 
Responsibility" in Essays on Freedom of Action (London : Routledge, 1973) at 
63.   
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Compulsion provides the basis for claims of exculpation contesting 
authorship-responsibility and hence, indirectly, moral responsibility. 
Claims of exculpation (or mitigation) stemming from coercion 
challenge directly the actor's being morally responsible for a wrongful 
act. From the point of view of the excuse theory, the classification of 
the various exculpatory claims in law turns on the source and nature 
of the relevant external or internal impediments precluding the 
agent's acting in compliance with the law13. 
 
 Freedom of choice in action, as a requirement of moral and 
legal responsibility, presupposes, among other things, that the actor 
is ‘master of his mind’, or that she is acting in a ‘normal’ frame of 
mind. Heat of passion and loss of self-control imply that the 
contribution of reason to the psychological process towards the 
formation of the will is precluded or substantially diminished14. There 
are two ways in which passion may affect a person's ability to choose 
freely. In some impetuous acts the urge does not circumvent the 
conscious self but, in a sense, passes through it. Because of its 
intensity, however, the urge overrides the actor's ability to exercise 
rational judgment; it defeats her moral resistance15. One might also 
consider as relevant here the so-called short-circuited reactions. These 
pertain to cases where an intense psychological urge is activated so 
abruptly that, in a way, circumvents the conscious self and affects 
directly the agent's motivational system. In such cases the agent's 
moral inhibitions are bypassed rather than overcome. Depending 
upon the degree to which self-control is lost, the provoked agent's 
response may be described as an impetuous act of the first type or as 
a ‘short-circuited reaction’. In the latter case, loss of self-control tends 
to involve a spontaneous, immediate reaction to the provocation 
received. The desire to inflict punishment on the provoker triggered 
                                                 
13 . H. Gross, A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York : Oxford Univ. Press, 1979) 
at 69. 
14 . In those cases where reason succumbs to passion, the will is determined by 
something external to it — a relation which Kant terms the 'heteronomy of the 
will'. In such cases the person's reasons for acting in a certain way pertain 
only to what he/she desires, independently of his moral beliefs. On the other 
hand, when the person's will is determined by reason, the will is said to be 
'self-ruled', for reason is viewed as something 'internal' to the will. A will that 
is determined by reason is at one with itself. According to Kant, such a will 
can override passion and desire.  
15 . N. R. F. Maier, "Frustration Theory : Restatement and Extension" (1956) 63 
Psychological Review 370 at 382. (The author suggests that there are 
intermediate states between being totally emotional and totally rational, 
wherein emotion and reason may conflict with each other). 
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by the judgment of wrongdoing is translated into action immediately, 
i.e. without going through any process of deliberation. In this case, 
the agent reacts almost without thinking, like the person who, when 
another raises her hand to hit her, instinctively ducks her head or 
raises her hands to protect herself. In the former case, by contrast, 
the provoked agent appears to be making a choice in anger to inflict a 
certain kind of punishment on the provoker. The exercise of choice 
here, however, does not necessarily require us to draw the inference 
that the provoked agent is in control of her actions, for the choice she 
makes, distorted by emotion, involves a misjudgment as to what form 
and degree of retaliation is appropriate. Depending upon the 
perceived gravity of the provocation, this misjudgment is to some 
extent excusable because people are fallible and often leap before 
they look, especially when they are conquered by passion. Both 
impetuous acts involving deliberation and short-circuited reactions 
should be distinguished from what is referred to as ‘reflex actions’. 
The latter lack a concrete psychological basis and therefore relate to 
the conditions of involuntariness rather that to those of moral or 
normative involuntariness. The ‘impetuous acts’ and, arguably, the 
‘short-circuited reactions’ are not irrelevant to the attribution of moral 
and, possibly, legal responsibility for both may be taken to manifest 
undesirable character traits or dispositions. 
 
 Other things being equal, of the two kinds of provoked 
persons, those who act upon impulse and without deliberation are in 
general less to blame than those who give way to a desire after going 
through a process of deliberation. This is an important consideration 
that the sentencer cannot ignore in determining the appropriate level 
of punishment for the lesser offence. Moreover, considering the 
accused's mode of retaliation in relation to the provocation offered 
may be important in answering the question of whether the accused 
was provoked to lose her self-control to such a degree as to commit 
an intentional killing. This approach consorts with the position that 
any reference to reasonableness or proportionality in the context of 
the provocation defence can only be relevant to answering the 
question of whether the provocation was such as to make the 
accused's giving way to anger and losing her self-control to such a 
degree as to lead her to commit an intentional killing appear a likely 
or not unexpected reaction. Admittedly, the more severe the 
provocation the more the psychological effort the provoked actor 
needs to make in order to maintain control over her actions. In other 
words, the greater the provocation the more ground there is for 
attributing the intensity of the actor's passions and her lack of self-
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control to the extraordinary nature of the situation in which she was 
placed rather than to an extraordinary deficiency in her character. 
       
    What do we mean, then, when we say that the provoked agent 
who acts ‘in the heat of the moment’ is not entirely free to choose? To 
answer this question one would need to look more closely at the 
interrelation between free agency and self-control. It has been 
asserted that freedom of choice presupposes that what motivates the 
agent to act in a certain way accords with her all-things-considered 
evaluations16. Watson draws a distinction between the agent's 
‘valuational’ and ‘motivational’ systems. He defines an agent's 
valuational system as 
 
that set of considerations which, when combined with his 
factual beliefs, yields judgements of the form : the thing for 
me to do in these circumstances, all things considered, is a. 
To ascribe free agency to a being presupposes it to be a being 
that makes judgements of this sort. To be this sort of being, 
one must assign values to alternative states of affairs, that is, 
rank them in terms of worth.17  
 
 Moreover, Watson defines the motivational system of an agent 
as that set of considerations which moves the agent to action. From 
this point of view, an action is held not to be free if the agent's 
motivational system is not aligned with, or correspond to, her 
evaluational system. In Watson's words : 
 
The possibility of unfree action consists in the fact that the 
agent's valuational and motivational system may not 
completely coincide. Those systems harmonize to the extent 
that what determines the agent's all-things-considered 
judgements also determines his actions...The free agent has 
                                                 
16 . Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 7,H. Rackham ed., 1934. (This approach 
has a very long pedigree, dating at least to Aristotle. According to Aristotle, 
the self-controlled or continent person feels the pull of temptation or an 
emotional urge, but resists acting on it as a result of her judgment that such 
action would not be the best; the incontinent person, by contrast, does not 
resist); D. Davidson, “How is Weakness of the Will Possible?” in Essays on 
Actions and Events (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1980) at 21-43. (It should be 
noted that the judgment on which the incontinent person fails to act does not 
need to be a moral judgment; it is rather the broad practical judgment that a 
certain action is best all things considered). 
17 .  G. Watson, "Free Agency" in Free Wil. (Oxford : Oxford University Press, 1982) 
at 105. 
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the capacity to translate his values into action; his actions 
flow from his evaluational system.18 
 
 Freedom of action as a requirement of responsibility 
presupposes not only that what motivates a person to act concurs 
with her evaluations; it presupposes, in addition, that the person's 
evaluations that move her to action take place in a ‘normal’ frame of 
mind. As Mele has noted : 
 
A self-controlled person is disposed to bring his motivations 
into line with his evaluations and to maintain that alignment. 
But there is more to being self-controlled than this, for one's 
evaluations themselves can be warped in various ways by 
one's wants and motivations. Hence, a self-controlled person 
must also be disposed to promote and maintain a structure of 
evaluations or values which is not unduly influenced by his 
motivations.19  
 
 As elaborated previously, provocation may provide the grounds 
for a partial excuse only if the victim's conduct is considered to be 
sufficiently wrongful, i.e., capable of raising legitimate anger or 
indignation20.  It is precisely her disapproval of the victim's conduct 
that motivates the agent to respond. In provocation, the provoked 
agent does not merely judge that there has been a wrongdoing, but 
also, to some extent, deliberates on what retaliatory action is 
required. But, where there is an overreaction, the agent judges that 
more retaliation is appropriate than it is in fact justified by the 
seriousness of the provocation. Although the agent's judgment of 
wrongdoing motivates her ‘choice’ to take punitive action, the ensuing 
urge to retaliate in a sense overrides the agent's own evaluational 
system, or her ability to assess correctly both the provoker's misdeed 
                                                 
18 .  Ibid at 106. 
19 . A. Mele, "Self-control, Action, and Belief" (1985) 2 American Philosophical 
Quarterly 22 at 171. 
20 . C. Taylor, "Responsibility for Self" in Free Will (Oxford : Oxford University 
Press, 1982) at 118. ("[n]aturally we think of the agent as responsible, in part, 
for what he does; and since he is an evaluator, we think of him as 
responsible in part for the degree to which he acts in line with his 
evaluations. But we are also inclined to think of him as responsible in some 
sense for these evaluations themselves". In provocation the assumption that 
only justified anger may render the provoked agent partially excusable on the 
basis of her loss of self-control implies that not only the provoked agent's 
response to the provocation but also her assessment of the victim's conduct 
is subject to judgment.)  
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and her own response to the provocation. Thus, we might say that the 
provoked agent is not fully free to choose because her capacity for 
evaluation is undermined by the overwhelming emotional pressure 
which she is experiencing21. In this respect, the provoked agent who 
overreacts in an outbreak of anger is similar to the victim of coercion 
who acts morally involuntarily. 
  
The Relevance of Character to Culpability in Provocation Cases 
 
     Unlike other defences based upon the idea of moral or 
normative involuntariness, loss of self-control as a result of 
provocation falls short of totally excluding moral and legal culpability. 
Giving way to anger — justified though such anger may be — or 
allowing one's reasoning ability (and hence her freedom to choose) to 
be overcome by passion furnishes sufficient grounds for holding the 
provoked agent partially responsible for her wrongdoing. The 
provoked agent who kills is still to blame for violating the general 
norm requiring that people should always hold their anger in check, 
even when faced with the most severe provocation. The agent remains 
morally and legally responsible for the lesser crime of manslaughter 
because, as a ‘normal’ person, she is assumed capable of resisting her 
impulse to kill the provoker. The provoked agent's inability to defeat 
her urge to kill shows that she lacks the power of reason to view her 
response to provocation in the context of a system of values and an 
assessed set of circumstances. Because that power of reason is 
lacking the provoked agent finds it impossible to control her impulse, 
since the stifling of the impulse cannot be made the objective of a 
voluntary choice. As long as the provoked person is regarded as a 
‘normal’ person, giving way to anger can only be due to a ‘defect of 
character’ manifested by her inability to view the impulsive action in 
the light of a given system of norms that proscribes the taking of 
human life. This is precisely what justifies the provoked killer's being 
held, to some extent, morally and legally responsible for her actions. 
                                                 
21 . R. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law (New York; 
New York UP, 1985) at 183 and 184. ("Strong emotional disturbance is 
known to primitivize thinking (much as does alcohol). A state of anger 
notoriously enhances one's aggressive tendencies, and reduces one's 
empathetic or sympathetic concern about injuring one’s target"); M.L. 
Corrado, Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law (New York & London : 
Garland Publishing, 1994) at 114; W. Mischel, “From Good Intentions to 
Willpower” in The Psychology of Action (New York : The Guildford Press, 
1996). 
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     In provocation the attribution of responsibility for the lesser 
offence can be explained on the basis of the theory of responsibility 
that focuses on the relationship between external conduct and 
human character. This theory postulates that moral praise or blame 
pertains not directly to acts but, rather, to the character traits. By 
character trait is understood any socially desirable or undesirable 
disposition or attitude that an act may be taken to reflect22. Although 
not all acts manifest character traits in a way that is morally or legally 
relevant, an actor cannot be held blameworthy or legally culpable 
unless her harmful conduct reflects a socially undesirable attitude. If 
it does, the degree of blame and punishment the actor deserves is to 
be determined by reference to the extent to which her attitude is 
deemed undesirable; if it does not, blame and punishment would be 
inappropriate, although certain non-punitive measures preventive of 
similar conduct in the future might be taken. Notwithstanding that 
attitudes may be volatile or unstable, the general assumption of this 
theory is that, other things being equal, a wrongful and unlawful act 
does manifest an undesirable character trait or attitude. From the 
point of view of the character theory of responsibility, the role of 
excuses is to block the normal inference from a wrongful act to an 
undesirable trait of character. Determining whether a wrongful act 
reflects a defect in the actor's character requires consideration of the 
actor's state of mind at the time of her act and of her ability to 
exercise control over her conduct. In this respect, the admission of 
loss of self-control in provocation is taken to block the normal 
inference from the act of killing to the character fault associated with 
the crime of murder. Nevertheless, the excusing condition here 
cannot preclude the actor's conviction for the lesser crime of 
manslaughter, for losing control and killing is still taken to reflect a 
defect in the actor's character. 
  
    From the viewpoint of the character theory of responsibility, 
one could also explain why losing control and killing in the face of a 
trivial provocation, or when no provocation has been offered, should 
not entitle the actor to a partial excuse. One might say that, if the 
provocation is not regarded as serious enough to raise justified anger 
to such a degree as to cause an ordinary person to lose her self-
                                                 
22 . W. Lyons, Emotion (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ. Press, 1980) at 194. ("We 
are blamed for character traits and their expression only in so far as it is 
considered that a character trait has given rise to actions which have had an 
undesirable upshot. If character traits did not ever do anything, they could 
never do harm"). 
Reason, Passion and Self-Control  : 
(2007) 38 R.D.U.S. Understanding the Moral Basis  229 
 of the Provocation Defence 
 
 
control and kill, the actor's response, on the spur of the moment 
though it may have been, manifests the same degree of character 
fault as that normally ascribed to a premeditated killing. The same 
may be said about those cases in which the actor is deemed 
responsible for creating a situation wherein a provocative event is 
highly likely to occur23. As Dressler has pointed out : 
 
under excuse theory, we do not (fully) blame a person who 
(partially) loses self-control if, but only if, he is not to blame 
for his anger and for his homicidal actions which result from 
it...A person who becomes sufficiently enraged to kill because 
the decedent acted in a nonwrongful manner arguably does 
not deserve to be excused. At the least the nonwrongfulness of 
the decedent's actions is highly pertinent in determining 
whether the actor's loss of self-control was excusable. Thus 
the individual who becomes angry and responds violently 
when another justifiably strikes him in self-defence and the 
person who unjustifiably creates the situation in which the 
provocation gives birth are blameworthy and should not be 
excused.24   
 
 If sufficient provocation cannot be shown or where the actor is 
deemed responsible for creating the conditions of provocation, the 
fact that the actor killed after she lost her self-control cannot on its 
own entitle her to an excuse on the grounds of the provocation 
defence. One might argue, however, that if a general loss of control 
defence was recognized, establishing provocation would not be 
necessary in order to reduce the actor's culpability for homicide. 
Nevertheless, where the actor's loss of self-control cannot be 
attributed to provocation, such a general loss of control defense may 
hold good only in so far as another acceptable reason for losing 
control can be brought forward. 
 
A General Loss of Control Defence? 
 
 Let us now consider a little further the idea that an accused 
might perhaps be able to rely on a general loss of control defense in 
                                                 
23 . One should note that, in English law, provocation may be accepted as a 
defence even though it was self-induced, provided that the objective and 
subjective requirements of the defense are met. The fact that the provocation 
was self-induced, however, may be relevant as an aggravating factor in 
determining the appropriate sentence imposed for the lesser offence. 
24 . Joshua Dressler, "Provocation : Partial Justification or Partial Excuse?" 
(1988) 51 Modern Law Review at 475. 
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some cases where the test of provocation cannot be met. As was 
noted before, in such cases the accused's plea for extenuation should 
not be accepted unless the accused offers a good reason for her 
losing her self-control in the circumstances. We might say that for an 
excuse to be allowed the accused's claim of impaired volition must be 
supported by evidence of a particular condition that is put forward as 
its triggering factor or ‘cause’. Although a number of such conditions 
have been singled out as providing the grounds for formulating 
general defence categories, a claim of impaired volition might perhaps 
be brought forward which may be difficult to subsume under one of 
the existing categories. In this respect, a general loss of control or 
impaired volition defence would serve to accommodate claims of 
excuse based on conditions lying outside the scope of the existing 
excuse-based legal defenses. An excuse-based defense of this kind 
would be open-ended, in the sense that, although it would rest upon 
the requirement of impaired volition, no specific condition or 
triggering factor would be laid down as the cause of the actor's 
impairment. It would rest upon the accused to bring forward evidence 
of an acceptable condition, or set of conditions, accounting for her 
(partial or total) lack of control over her conduct. Such a general 
impaired volition defence may be introduced either to complement or 
even to replace (i.e. as encompassing) an existing defense category. 
 
 For example, the American Model Penal Code provided the 
reduction of homicide from murder to manslaughter in those cases 
where the accused acted "under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or 
excuse". It is added that "[t]he reasonableness of such explanation or 
excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the 
actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to 
be"25. Under this provision there are no special limitations as to what 
sort of circumstances may give rise to such an excuse-based defence. 
It is upon the jury to decide whether the accused in fact acted under 
the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and it is 
upon them to determine whether the disturbance was one for which 
there is reasonable explanation or excuse. An excuse-based defense 
similar to the MPC's 'extreme emotional disturbance' defence may be 
relied upon to deal, for example, with some cases of cumulative 
provocation lying on the borderline between provocation and 
diminished responsibility where neither provocation nor diminished 
                                                 
25 . AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official 
Draft and Revised Comments) (Philadelphia, 1980) art. 210.3(1)(b). 
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responsibility seem capable of providing the basis of the accused's 
plea for a partial excuse. In these cases, the lapse of time between 
the last provocative incident and the accused's response, or the 
admission of forethought and deliberation, would appear to militate 
against the ‘hot anger’ requirement of provocation. On the other 
hand, the assumption that the accused is a ‘normal’ person, or the 
relatively uncertain or temporary nature of his psychological 
impediment, may render the defence of diminished responsibility 
(available in England) difficult to accept26. Here, the accused might 
nevertheless be able to rely on a defense of impaired volition, on the 
grounds of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, by drawing 
attention to the psychological effect that continued abuse or violence 
has had on her and the ensuing difficulties in checking, through 
rational judgment, the disruptive force of the ensuing emotions.  
 
Concluding Remarks  
 
 The defence of provocation operates as an excuse on the 
assumption that provocative conduct is capable of raising in an 
ordinary person such a degree of psychological pressure, in the form 
of angry passion, as to deprive her of her ability to exercise rational 
control over her actions. Excusing those who succumb to anger in 
the face of grave provocation and lose control of their actions 
                                                 
26 . The English Homicide Act, 1957 (c.11) section 2. (“Where a person kills or is 
party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was 
suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of 
arrest or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by 
disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his 
actions and omissions in doing or being party to the killing.”); R v Byrne 
[1960] 2 QB 396. (Diminished responsibility is classified as an excusatory 
defence, as it recognizes that, although an illegal act was committed, the 
accused’s moral culpability is reduced due to her mental instability. Canada 
does not have a diminished responsibility defence similar to that provided for 
by s. 2 of the English Homicide Act that operates to reduce murder to 
manslaughter on the basis of an abnormality of mind substantially impairing 
the accused’;s responsibility for the offence. There are some decisions, 
however, that appear to have recognized mental impairment less than that 
required under the s. 16 mental disorder defence. Such an impairment was 
held to be relevant to determining whether the accused actually formed the 
intent for murder.); Swain [1991] 1 SCR 933, 987; Jacquard [1997] 1 SCR 
314, 333. (There also appears to be growing recognition of the combined use 
of other failed defences (such as provocation, self-defence and intoxication) 
where the defendant may not be able to rely on any particular defence, but 
the cumulative effect of the defences is sufficient to raise a doubt as to the 
existence of the mental state required for the offence.). 
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constitutes a concession to the ‘failings’ of human nature and 
becomes possible because these failings are seen as being common to 
all people. From this point of view the emphasis is on the element of 
loss of self-control as a factor reducing the actor's moral 
responsibility for her actions. In so far as the actor's anger at the 
author of the provocation is morally justified, an intentional killing 
committed in the ‘heat of passion’ does not reflect the moral 
disposition or trait of character normally associated with murder. 
Nevertheless, this sort of pressure can only support a claim of 
extenuation, not exculpation, for the provoked actor has failed to live 
up to community standards which demand us to exercise self-control 
even under pressure. 
 
 Impaired volition does not mean that the provoked agent must 
have lost his self-control in an absolute sense, for loss of self-control 
is a matter of degree and, as such, it does not always preclude some 
form of deliberation or choice. What must be precluded or, at any 
rate, seriously affected, however, if provocation is to provide a partial 
excuse, is the actor's capacity of assessing the moral significance of 
her actions and of bringing her actions into line with her all-things-
considered moral choices. If a case does not meet the requirements of 
the provocation defense, considering the wrong which the accused 
may have suffered at her victim's hands and the effect this may have 
had on the accused's state of mind may be relevant to establishing 
another excusing condition, such a diminished responsibility or 
extreme emotional disturbance, as the true basis of the accused's 
defence to a murder charge. 
